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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OSBC)RXE .A.LLEX, 
Plaintiff and R-espondent 
vs. 
ROSE P ~\Rl( PH~\R~IACY, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 7672 
BRIEF OF APPEL·LANT 
STATEME~T ,OF THE FACTS 
The plaintiff, Os horne Allen, requested a declara-
tory judgment seeking to relieve himself from a nega-
tive covenant in his contract of employment with the 
defendant and appellant, Rose Park Pharmacy. No 
other part of the contract whereby he was hired as 
a pharmacist and manager has been attacked but 
only this single paragraph which reads: 
8. Osborne agrees that in the event of ter-
Inination of this contract for any reason, he 
shall fully account for all funds, inventory, as-
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sets and equipment and he shall not directly or 
indirectly compete, as an employee or principal, 
in the operation of a drug store or pharmacy 
within a radius of two miles of this drug store 
for ~a period of five years thereafter. Breach or 
threatened breach of the terms of employment 
shall entitle this Pharmacy to injunctive relief 
in addition to other remedies. 
After trial of the issues the District Court held, 
''The Court is of the opinion in this matter the 
parties dealt in good faith. The defendants, I feel, 
had no intention of making use of any skill that the 
plain tiff had and thereafter discharging him to his 
disadvantage. However, if people enter into a contr.act 
with good faith and good intentions, there isn't any-
thing to prevent them from changing their minds 
later and employing a relative, and I think these peo-
ple saw those possibilities, ~and that is the reason they 
had a contract permitting the termination of the con-
tract on notice. 
''I am of the op1n1on that the five years is a 
modest arrangement, that in a business that is start-
ing up five years is usually necessary for protection, 
but the Court is of the opinion that the area is too 
broad, that from the pharmacy to the southwest in-
volves such ~a heavily populated area that it is an 
undue restriction and constitutes a restraint of trade. 
The Court is further of the opinion that there is no 
mutuality in this contl}act, that it is· a restraint of 
trade, for an employer to he able to employ a man 
and discharge him on a short notice ~and thereby 
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re~trict hin1 fron1 practicing his profession for a period 
of ti1ne thereafter, beeau~l\ \vith a short time he would 
not haYe acquired any secrets, he \Vouldn 't be ~able to 
do then1 any da1nage by anything that he learned in 
the establishment, and this contract has to he looked 
at to be enforced under any condition that may arise 
after it is signed. I am also of the opinion that there 
is no proper consideration in the contract. For lack 
of 1nutuality and lack of consideration, and because it 
i~ in restraint of trade, the Court finds that Paragraph 
8 of the contract, "-hich has reference to the competi-
tion that the plaintiff rnay give to the defendant, is 
unenforceable." (R. 93-94) 
Based upon this oral opinion the Court made and 
entered Findings (R. 14) and a Judgment (R. 18) 
declaring that the said negative covenant was invalid 
and unenforceable. 
The situation of the parties as of the time of 
1naking the Contract of Employment in November of 
1949 was as follo\\-s. The Geurts Brothers, Theodore 
I., William T. and Heber J. had instituted a shopping 
area at 4th North Street and Oakley Street in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. This is in the extreme Northwest 
portion of the populated area of the City (see Exhibit 
A). They had built and were operating a grocery 
store on the North side of the street and were in 
the stage of cornpleting a drugstore building on the 
other side of 4th North Street. 
A corporation \\'as finally formed, Rose Park 
Pharu1aty, uy these Geurts Brothers and their wive:;;, 
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to operate the. drug store. Negotiations were had to 
ascertain ··whether a lease, employment or other ar-
rangenlent should be affected for operating the phar-
macy. 
The parties hereto entered into negotiations for 
the employment of the plaintiff to operate appellant's 
pharmacy as Inanager and pharmacist. The amount 
of salary was agreed to (R. 77). The plaintiff insisted 
upon being given ~a right to acquire an ownership 
interest in the defendant corporation (25% ). 
Q. Mr. Allen, would you have signed the 
contract presented to you if it hadn't had the 
provision for gaining an interest In the cor-
poration~ 
A. No, that was-
MR. PuGSLEY : We object. 
A. (Continuing)-the main purpose. 
MR. PuGSLEY: We object as immaterial. 
THB CouRT: Overruled. Y·ou may answer. 
A. Those were my terms when I negoti-
ated the contract. There are other figures. That 
was my terms. I started out with 49 per cent. 
working interest in the store. They readjusted 
it to 25 percent. That was one of the qualifica-
tions, or I would never have gone into the 
business. 
Q. Why did you want to obt,ain a share 
in the business~ 
A. Because I was going to make it my 
life's work. 
Q.. Would you have signed the contract if 
you had known you were to be employed for 
only one year~ 
MR. PuGSLEY: We object to that as lin-
material also. 
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THE CouRT: Overruled . 
.:\.. No, I \Youldn 't ha Ye signed it. I would 
never havp left n1y other job. 
)lR. RICHARDS: That is 'all. 
CROSS-EX.A.~1:IN ATION 
BY )lR. PUGSLEY : 
Q. You read over the contract before you 
8igned it, did you not 'l 
.... \. Yes, I did. 
Q. And you accepted the 30-days notice 
and the pay for the 30 days, did you not~ 
A. Yes, I did. 
~IR. PuGsLEY : That is all ( R. 92 and 93) . 
... \ reading of the con tract, (Exhibit B) details the 
tern1s of employn1ent, his bonus program to ~acquire 
stock and notice before termination, all of which were 
accepted and the benefits taken by plaintiff, except 
that he no'v seeks to squirm out of the negative 
covenant. 
It is further pertinent that plaintiff lived in ad-
jacent blocks in \Yh'at is known as the ''Rose P~ark'' 
area and knew the people therein. (R. 33). As stated 
at the trial by nlr. William T. Geurts, one of appel-
lant's officers: 
Q. Will you state what your intention was 
so far as the permanency of Mr. Allen's em-
ployment when you formed the contract~ 
A. Our intention was to employ a phar-
lnacist and manager to handle the full manage-
n1ent and operation of the drug store, and when 
we selected Mr. Osborne, our intention was just 
that. · 
Q. Did you at that time believe that Mr. 
Osborne \vould be satisfactory for that purpose~ 
A. 'V e had confidence he would be. 
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Q. Did you have any discussion as to the 
basis of the two-mile radius and the five-year 
period that is set forth in the contract~ 
A. Yes, my other two brothers and I dis-
cussed that phase of the thing. In the first 
place we knew that Mr. Osborne was residing 
in the Rose Park area. We also knew that he 
had at least made overtures to those people 
who were intending to develop the shopping 
center over in Rose Park, and we were not at 
that time sure whether or not Mr. Allen would 
want to remain with us. We were 'also not 
certain that competitors might not want to take 
away from us, Mr. Allen, and we felt it was 
necessary to safe-guard ourselves, since we were 
investing what we considered at least a con-
siderable sum in the establishment of that busi-
ness, and also in the initial stages of operations 
at least investing what loss we might sustain 
to develop good will. We wanted to protect 
those investments (R. 74-75). 
Q.. Now you testified as to some of your 
reasons for including the two-mile radial area 
in the contract. Will you state what the reasons 
were for including the time of five years~ 
A. Well, the time of five years, our rea-
soning was along this line, that a firm does not 
very readily build up good will. It is more or 
less flexible and fluid, it passes over a short 
period of time, whereas a longer period it be-
comes stable, and we, felt that a five-year period 
would bridge us over any good will that might 
attach to individual employees and would become 
stable ·as the good will of the firm. 
Q. Did you consider a two-mile radius of 
the drug store would be a reasonable radius. 
A. ~Oh, yes, I do, because there is this situa-
tion.· We are the most northwesterly drug store 
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in tht:.' recently developed are'a of Salt Lake 
City. r~ehe other drug stores rnainly are between 
us and ttnvn, and, \vell, \Ye presumed that the 
shopping habits of people rnight cause them to 
stop either going to or corning from town, and 
\Ye felt that \Ye should protect ourselves against 
that contingency. 
Q. Do you consider that the five-year peri-
od of time is a reason'able period~ 
.... \.. Yes, I think so. ( R. ·77 -78) 
The drugstore \vas a new business in the area, 
neYer opened before they hired plaintiff. As shown 
by the rnap, Exhibit ..... \., it is the last such store in the 
X orth,vest section of Salt Lake City. Within the two-
utile area there are eight drugstores as shown by the 
rnap, Exhibit ~'I~'' but within the entire Salt L'ake 
City area as sho\vn by the classified advertising in the 
current telephone book (Exhbit No. 1) there are 90 
drugstores . 
..... \s the drug store was established and started 
business, the delivery of drugs constantly expanded. 
The plaintiff testified that he had delivered in the 
immedi,ate area, to the Air Base Village and Redwood 
Road on the \V-est, to 9th North on the North (R. 53), 
East to Second West and North Temple (R. 39) and 
South to Ninth South (R. 40). He had a "tremendous 
amount of deliveries" during the time of his employ-
Inent (R. 54). Mr. W. T. Geurts, one of the owners 
of appellant corporation testified that he had delivered 
as far East as the Sugarhouse shopping 'area; '' E'' 
Street, '' F '' ~treet and First A venue; South to lOth 
South and \\rest Ternple and 12th South and immedi-
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ately East of Redwood Road (R. 77). 
We find no affirrnative testimony stating that 
either the two-mile radius or the five-year period pre-
scribed by the employrnent contract are unreasonable 
or unduly restrictive. The only item thereon is the 
·bald declaration by plaintiff that he desires to com-
pete in the area, see Request for Admission (R. 10). 
He testified that he had not looked for employment 
in the two-mile area and had no offers of employment 
within that area and did not desire to be employed at 
a drug store scheduled to be constructed in the Rose 
Park area (R. 55-56). 
As pharmacist and manager he had full access 
to the 6980 prescriptions of appellant's customers and 
felt at liberty to use or disclose these to others (R. 
55), likewise as to the narcotics and· poison list (R. 
57), trade markups, bookkeeping, customers' names 
and similar confidential information. 
STATEl\fENT OF P~OINTS 
I. 
THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT WAS FAIR AND 
REASONABLE. 
II. 
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS WERE REASON-
ABLE AND FAIR. 
III. 
THERE· WAS MUTUALITY IN THE CONVENANTS IN 
THE CONTRACT. 
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IV. 
rHE CONTRACT \VAS SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE 
tJONSIDERATION. 
v. 
THE CONTRACT RESTRICTIONS ARE NOT CON-
TRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED. 
VI. 
THE RESPONDENT ACCEPTED BENEFITS OF THE 
CONTRACT AND IS ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING 
RESTRICTIONS. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT WAS FAIR AND 
REASONABLE. 
II. 
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS WERE REASON-
ABLE AND FAIR. 
This was a negotiated contract of employment 
reached after the customary arms length dealing. 
nir. \v ... illiam T. Geurts testified that they had discussed 
the employment first about Oct. 25, 1949 and presented 
the contract to respondent about a week to ten days 
later (R. 73) and respondent retained it for about a 
week before signing it (R. 73). Respondent emphati-
cally stated on rebuttal, direct testimony that he had 
insisted upon an interest in the business, ''Those were 
1ny ter1ns when I negotiated the contract." (R. 92). 
To roughly analyze the Contract of Employment 
(Exhibit "B") we find the following terms: in the 
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prearnble respondent "upon the following terms !and 
conditions'' accepts the employrnent and agrees to 
perform. The first three paragraphs detail the employ-
ing and the duties. rrhe next paragraph outlines his 
compensation of so much per week plus a bonus of 
ten per cent of the net profits which are computed 
in pursuance of the formula recited in paragraph five 
and by paragraph six to be accumulated for purchase 
of stock in appellant up to 25o/o ownership interest. 
Paragraph seven states that it is a continuing con-
tract of employment requiring him to give 60 days 
notice and the appellant to give 30 days notice of inten-
tion to quit or discharge or five days notice in case 
of his breach of the contract. Paragraph eight is the 
one in controversy and requires him to account for 
all funds in the event of termination ''for any reason'' 
and that "he shall not directly or indirectly compete 
as an employee or principal, in the operation of a 
drug store or pharmacy within a radius of two miles 
of this drug store for a period of five years thereafter.'' 
Breach would entitle appellant to injunctive relief. 
The last paragraph provided for costs and attorneys 
fees to enforce the contract. 
Plaintiff does not claim that he did not read or 
understand the contract. He admits that he has re-
ceived the benefits, including compensation for 30 days 
after his discharge in lieu of 30 days notice. He does 
not tender back this benefit hut only asks relief from 
his lack of foresight, as he puts it, in agreeing not to 
compete. The District Court f.ound that the parties 
10 
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dealt in good faith (R. 93). 
The la\Y relative to these restrictive covenants has 
undergone a change in the past one hundred years. 
There has been an abrupt and firn1 reversal of the old 
English rule that such agreements \Yere against public 
policy and hence unenforceable. The law not only 
ha~ been relaxed but now in the United States is 
clear that so long as the restraint in length of time 
and area of space is reasonable, the negative agree-
ment not to compete is valid and enforceable, See: 
17 C.J.S. 626 Par. 243 Contracts; Williston on Con-
tracts, (Rev. Ed.) \~ ol. V, p. 4578, Sect. 1635. 
The burden of proof now is upon the contracting 
party, \Yho seeks to escape from his agreement, to 
sho"'" that the negatiYe covenant is unduly restrictive 
or oppressive. Your Court has recently gone over this 
subject matter and rendered a decision in Case No. 
7350, The Valley ~Iortuary vs. Lionel Fairbanks, 225 
Pac. ( 2d) 739, ______ U t. ------· 
By contract in 1945 the defendant agreed that for 
twenty-five years he \vould not operate a mortuary or 
funeral business in Provo, south of Provo in Utah 
County or in Juab County. This action was started 
in 1948 to enjoin future violations and for damages. 
The lo\Yer Court awarded damages and ·an injunction 
against future violations. The defendant then appeale<l 
and your Court, after an extensive review of the facts 
and law, sustained the injunction but remanded the 
case to the lovver court only for additional evidence on 
the damages suffered. 
11 
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Though this case involved the sale of a business 
and impliedly the good will thereof, still your Court 
felt no problem as to the area or time stated in the 
restrictive covenant. The interdicted area of Provo 
City, all of Utah County south thereof and all of Juab 
County was broader than the bounds of that defend-
ant's former area of operation and such was specified 
''in· the agreement to exclude competition by the de-
fendant in a more wide-spread area than would have 
been excluded by the sale of the good will without 
the addition of the restrictive clause.'' 
In short, the broad area and the 25-year period 
were held by your Court to be reasonable and the in-
junctive relief granted was affirmed on the appeal. 
Comparing this with the two-mile radius and the five-
year period now before this Court, we feel that no 
hesitancy should exist in sustaining this modest time 
and ·area restriction. 
The contract in our present case (Exhibit "B") 
reveals that this is more than an ordinary employer-
employee relationship which has been created. A new 
pharmacy and drug store was being opened with the 
defendant's money risked in ·an area having no such 
facilities nearby. Plaintiff w'as to act not only as a 
pharmacist but also as manager and in addition, he 
was to acquire a proprietary interest in the business 
itself through a stock-bonus pTogram. This gave him 
an interest in the good will and development of the 
business itself. l-Ie was in a position of direct, personal 
eontact with the custon1ers as manager and in his 
12 
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profe88ional eapaeity a8 a pharn1acist. 
There i8 nothing ag·ain8t public policy to i1npose 
rea8onable re8trietion8 upon ·an en1ployee in such a 
key po8ition a8 he is in a position to take from the 
en1ployer part of the good \Yill if he departs from his 
employn1ent and 8et8 up in competition. The trade 
seeret:5 of defendant's pharmacy in the form of phar-
nlaceutical prescriptions, narcotic records, etc., names 
of custoiners, Inethods of buying, credit program, mark-
ups, trade preferences, and general policy were all 
aYailable to the plaintiff and in danger of being passed 
on to competitors in the trade ·area or used by the 
plaintiff in the area to compete \Yith defendant. This 
man \vas not a mere "'soda jerk" or clerk. 
\V e should like to refer you to 17 C.J .. S. 254, p. 636. 
\\-e have reviewed the decisions cited thereunder. 
Though there are several in which the restrictions 
have been held invalid, such in the main are instances 
where unlimited restrictions have been imposed or 
the employee is -an ordinary S!alesman. Let us cite a 
fe'' of the majority and distinctly typical decisions 
wherein the employee's negative covenant has been 
held valid: 
Agreements not to engage in a competing business 
\vill ordinarily be held valid where necessary to pro-
tect the employer against employee's use of trade 
secrets confided to him during employment. N.J.-Bond 
Electric Corporation v. Keller, 166 A. 341, 113 N.J. 
Eq. 195. Ideal Laundry Co. v. Gugliemone, 151 A. 617, 
107 N.J. Eq. 108. N.Y.-Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers 
13 
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Film Products, 179 N.Y.S. 325, 189 App. Div. 556, 
reversing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Warren, 178 N.Y.S. 
14, 108 Misc. 680. Davey Tree Expert Co. v. Black, 
244 N.Y.S. 239, 137 Misc. 702. Stoneman v. Wilson, 
192 S.E. 81'6. 
Prohibiting employee froin engaging in undertak-
ing business in city or vicinity for ten years. Chan-
dler, Gardner, & Williams v. Reynolds, 145 N.E. 476, 
250 Mass. 309. 
Prohibiting general manager of optical company 
from entering into competing business for five years 
anywhere in the United States west of Detroit, Mich.-
Wahlgren v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., C.C.A. Ill., 
68 F.2d 660, affirming D.C., Bausch & Lomb Optical 
Co. v. Wahlgren, 1 F. Supp. 799, and Certiorari denied 
Wahlgren v. Bausch & Lomb Optieal Co., 54 .S.Ct. 
774, 292 U.S. 639, 78 L.Ed. 1491, rehearing denied 54 
S.Ct. 862, 272 U.S. 615, 78 L.Ed. 1491. 
''If an employer is engaged in a business which 
he carried on through agents or servants whose per-
formance of their duties involves a confidential knowl-
edge of the employer's trade or business and brings 
them into such direct and personal business relation 
with the employer's business and its p~atrons that 
the agents or servants commonly acquire the names 
and residence of customers, their requirements, credit 
and other trade or business information, or a personal 
following or clientele during the period of their serv-
ice, then it is not injurious to the public, and it is 
reasonable to permit the employer and the agent or 
14 
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~erYant to enter into an ancill,ary covenant in partial 
restraint of trade to protect the e1nployer 's business 
fron1 the con1petition of the servant for a reasonable 
length of ti1ne throughout a definite area." Tolman 
Laundry Co. v. \r alker, 187 ... -\.. 836, 838, 171 Md. 7 . 
... \gree1nent relating to restraint on connection with 
business in county only covered such employment _as 
'vould enable diversion of trade to subsequent employer. 
-Durbro\Y Conunission Co. Y. Donner, 229 N.W. 635, 
201 ""'"is. 175. 
Requiring general n1anager of loan and investment 
company, not to engage in same business in same city 
for one year following termination of employment.-
Eigelbach v. Boone Loan & Investment Co., 287 S.W. 
225, 216 Ky. 69. 
Binding clothing store manager not to enter com-
peting business for period of t\YO years within stated 
territory.-l\Ioskin Bros. v. Swartzberg, 155 .S.E. 154, 
199 N.C. 539. 
Requiring head salesman not to engage in business 
of selling products similar to those sold by employer 
in certain territory, for eighteen months.-Grand Union 
Tea Co. v. Walker, 195 N.E. 277, 208 Ind. 245, 98 
A.L.R. 958. 
Restricting employees of industrial engineering 
firm for two years from entering into the employ of 
clients of employer. May v. Young, 2 A.2d 385, 125 
Conn. 1, 119 A.L.R. 1445. 
Restraining employee from engaging in competitive 
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advertising business in ·any city o1· state in which he 
worked for two years. Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. 
Mas·on, 289 S.W. 295, 217 I<::y. 269, 52 A.L.R., 1344. 
Requiring physician's employee, given access to 
the acquaintance and confidence of patients, not to 
enter into competition with physician for three years 
after termination of relationship. Granger v. Cr~aven, 
199 N.W. 10, 159 Minn. 296, 52 A.L.R. 1356. 
Prohibiting employee of tree co1npany for year, 
from engaging in tree surgery within the radius of 
one hundred miles of city in which company main-
tained office. Davey Tree Expert Co. v. Ackelbein, 25 
S. W. 2d 62, 233 Ky. 115. 
, Let us keep in mind that the employer is not here 
suing out an injunction, but the employee, separ:ated 
from his position in accord with the contr~act, now seeks 
to have this Court, by declaratory judgment, say that 
one phrase of his agreement, solemnly executed by 
him as a condition precedent to procuring his position, 
is invalid and unenforceable. The burden is on the 
plaintiff herein. The contract gave him the right to 
quit at ~any time after notice to defendant. He is in 
no different position now than if he'd exercised his 
right to terminate his employment so as to go into 
competition. 
The most recent case in our neighboring state of 
Wyoming is Ridley v. Krout, 180 P .. (2d) 124, (page 8). 
Therein the employment contract was for keymaking, 
bicycle repairs, etc. at Sheridan, Wyo. The neg,ative 
covenant covered 17 years and encompassed Sheridan 
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County, J ohn~on l'iounty and Ca1npbell County, all in 
\\"yoming. The en1ploype departed fro1n his service 
and e1nployer ~ought an injunction. The Wyon1ing 
Court denied the injunction, basing the same in part 
on the grounds that he \Yas a g·eneral repairm·an and 
did not po~~e~~ any trade secrets and that it was 
ag·ainst public policy to require the people of the st·ate 
100 1nile~ a\Yay in one of the restricted counties to 
travel such distances to procure repair of their bi-
cycles, la\YnnlO\\ .. ers, etc. at Sheridan. (p. 133). 
The instant case holds no such public disadvantage. 
By defendant's undenied answer it is shown that the 
plaintiff is no\Y engaged as a pharmacist in Salt Lake 
City and hence, through use of telephone and delivery 
service, the public may procure his services and he 
may carry on his profession. He was working for 
vv: algrens before the contract with appellant and now 
is so employed. However, appellant does not want 
him competing in the store's immediate neighborhood. 
He now seeks the court's approbation for competing 
in wilful violation of his covenant not to do so. There 
are many other drug stores available to the public, 
not only in the two-mile radius, but also many more 
in Salt Lake City proper. No unlawful restl'1aint of 
trade can be claimed herein. 
An understanding of the fact that this contract was 
executed prior to the opening of defendant's .pharmacy 
and that palintiff was afforded the opportunity of 
acquisition of ownership interest, differentiates this 
fro1n any case cited in the general collection of authori-
17 
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ties in C.J.S. The parties here dealt at arms length 
and after rna ture consideration executed the restric-
tive covenant. This is not oppressive and imposes no 
undue hardship on the plaintiff, as is evidenced by 
his ready procurement of employment as a pharmacist 
just outside of the two-mile radial area at W algrens. 
In 9 A.L.R. 1467 is an annotation which purports 
to outline the reasons for sustaniing or breaking these 
negative covenants. We quote in part 
"The validity of covenants by employees not 
to engage in a similar or competing husin~ss for 
a definite period of time, following the termina-
tion of the contract of employment in which the 
covenant is incorporated, may be sustained, al-
though the contract is recognized to be in re-
st~aint of trade. The test generally applied in 
determining the validity of such a covenant is 
whether or not the restraint is necessary for 
the' protection of the business or good will of 
the employer, and, if so, whether it imposes on 
the employee any greater restraint than is rea-
sonably necessary to secure to the business of 
the employer, or the good will thereof, such pro-
tection, regard being had to the injury which 
may result to the public, by restraining the 
breach of the covenant, in the loss of the serv-
ice and skill of the employee, and the danger of 
his coming a charge upon the public." 
We have referred briefly to the reasonableness of 
the two-mjle radial area. Let us now turn to the 
time of five years for consideration. In the Valley 
Mortuary ca.se the Utah Sup. Ct. did not consider the 
twenty-five year period excessive and the covenant was 
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~u~tained. The nu1 p \Yhich plaintiff has presented for 
ad1nis~ion of facts sho"·s that the pharmacy at issue 
is in the extreine Northwest portion of the populated 
area of Salt Lake City. The time period prescribed is 
reasonable to allo''T for the develop1nent of subdivisions 
and other population expansion in the vicinity pio-
neered by defendant and served through delivel'y serv-
ice from the pharmacy. 
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff herein to 
sho'Y any unreasonableness of restraint or any 1adverse 
affect on the public.· If any invalidity arises it is only 
where the covenant offends public policy and not just 
if it limits one individual. We submit that the ap.pel-
lant, having had the fortitude to open up a pharmacy 
in the extreme Northwest portion of the city to serve 
the gro\Ying population there, should be entitled to 
protection fron1 a former employee's comp.etition in 
violation of his covenants. The defendant's foresight 
and care in protecting itself from just what plaintiff 
now seeks to do should be rewarded rather than be 
punished. 
III. 
THERE WAS MUTUALITY IN THE COVENANTS IN 
THE CONTRACT. 
IV. 
THE CONTRACT WAS SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE 
CONSIDERATION. 
The matter of mutuality and the adequacy of the 
e1nployrnent contract can well be considered together. 
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Though each such element may be raised in relation to a 
contract we assert that in this instance both were present. 
On the part of respondent, the employee, h~ __ agreed 
to perform services as pharmacist and manager, to 
give 60 days notice of intention to quit, to account for 
all funds and in the event of termination for any rea-
l:-;On, not to compete for five years in a two-mile area. 
On the part of the appellant, Rose Park Pharmacy, 
it agreed to employ him as pharmacist and manager, 
to pay him a stipulated weekly wage, to pay him a 
bonus from net profits, to permit him to. acquire up to 
25% of its stock, to give him 30 days prior notice of 
intention to discharge him. As an implied obligation, 
the Pharmacy had to maintain a building in which 
to operate the business, stock the store, provide em-
ployees to assist him, provide finances and payroll for 
the drug store's operation. 
Let us first consider whether there exists that 
.· mutuality of obligation or remedy which may support 
this enforceable agreement not to compete. It is 
fundamental that such mutuality is never absent if a 
consideration moves from both parties. 17 C.J.S. 445. 
The present agreement is a bilateral contract, executed 
by both parties cont1aining promises and obligations, 
one from another. 
An early Utah case considered this matter, Abba 
v. .Smyth, 21 U t. 109, 59 Pac. 75'6. Therein plaintiff 
was employed by defendant to farm certain acreage in 
Weber County upon a share crop hasis for the f~arming 
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~ea~on~ l~~)S, 1899 and 1900. Defendant "ras to provide 
the farrn, ~Ped~, in1plernents, board and lodging and 
a helper. In .~..-\.pril plaintiff started \vork, but in N ovem-
ber of the first Year defendant ordered hirn from the 
. . 
farrn and preYented hirn from con1pleting the season~. 
Plaintiff ~ned for hi~ darnages sustained by breach of 
the contract. One defense raised was the lack of 
mutuality as to rernedy. The Court stated: 
""The rule in Yoked by the respondent that 
\vhen only one of the parties signs the contract, 
such party only becomes hound thereby, does 
not apply here, as both parties signed the con-
tract, and it \vas mutually binding upon both. 
By signing the contract both become obligated 
by its terms and consented to its provisions, 
and should be held bound by such reasonable 
construction as the contract implies. The agree-
ment \vas not unilateral, but bound both parties 
to it. It was not void under the statute of 
frauds, as both parties executed the writing 
which imposed mutual obligations on each. 
But it is claimed that the testimony was inad-
missible, and was rejecte·d on the ground that it 
\vas irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent; 
that it \vas unilateral and only bound the de-
fendant; that it lacked mutuality, and was there-
fore void under the statute of frauds. 
As already stated, we do not concur in this 
view." 
Citations supporting generally this rule of your 
Court may be found in 17 C.J.S. 443-6. Likewise it 
is well established that the mutuality may even be 
irnplied, see 17 C.J.S. 448. 
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In actuality, these employ1nent contracts stand in 
a ·different ·area of approach than many types of agree-
Inent. · The promise on each side is of a different 
character as one provides the skill and manpower 
and th~ other the . facilities, rna terials and salary. It 
is true that ~· .. contract: bearing a negative covenant 
~~st be supporte~ . "Qy valuable consideration which 
appears on the face of the agreement. However, the 
adequacy of such consideration cannot be inquired 
into by the yourts. .See: 17 C.J.S. 641; Griffin v. Guy 
(Md.), 192 A. 359; ~and Danner v. Hoffman (Pa.) 26 
Pa. Dist. 636. The earlier rule was that the restraint 
must be supported by a consideration equivalent in 
value to the restraint imposed. This doctrine has been 
repudiated. 13- C.J. 488. 
Discussing contract principles recently, your Court 
1n Van Tassell v. L·ewis, ______ Utah ______ , 222 Pac. (2d) 
350 correctly st,ated that the words, "in consideration 
of'' have· a technical meaning in contract law denoting 
that which supports or gives validity to the contract; 
that which supports the meeting of the minds. (p. 353). 
Exhibit "B" in our present litigation, after the intro-
ductory paragraph reads, ''In consideration of the 
· coveuants ·herein contained the Pharmacy hereby em-
ploys Osborne (respondent) upon the following terms 
and conditions and Osborne accepts such employment 
. and agrees to ·perform the services sp-ecified.'' 
v. 
THE CONTRACT RESTRICTIONS ARE NOT CON-
TRARY· TO: PUBLIC POLICY AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED. 
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VI. 
THE RESPONDENT ACCEPTED BENEFITS OF THE 
CONTRACT AND IS ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING 
RESTRICTIONS. 
In no portion of the reeord is there a single item of 
evidence \Yhich \Yould iinport that the public could in any 
manner suffer from lack of respondent's services with-
in the prohibited t'vo-Inile area. Other drug stores 
are aYailable both \vithin and \vithout the said terri-
tory. ...\ppellant is still operating· its pharmacy and 
serving the entire area. Respondent is employed 
again at ''Talgrens and is not in danger of becoming 
a charge of the community because of being restricted 
from the area. He has not sought a job within the 
area and testified that he has no offers of employ-
ment within the s'ame. 
Respondent has taken and retained all of the 
benefits and advantages of the contract, including 30 
days pay after his employment had been terminated, but 
seeks to renege on this one obligation not to compete 
in the limited area. His evident desire for equitabl~ 
relief from his solemn covenant should be accompanied 
by some tender on his own part to do equity, but no 
such offer has ever been made. 
Appellant respectfully submits that it entered into 
the agreement \Yith respondent in good faith, after 
negotiations and study, 1and that it has faithfully per-
formed its duties, agreements and obligations recited 
by the e111ployment contract. The trial court erred in 
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holding that this restrictive paragraph of the contra~t 
was unenforceable. 
We sub1nit that the judgment of the lower court 
should be reversed and the 'appellant awarded its costs 
herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYE.S & RAMPT~ON, 
721 Cont'l Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Bv HARRY D. PuGSLEY 
"' Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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